RoT

TLDR: Germany’s approval of a French nuclear fuel project using Russian licences appears to contradict Europe’s effort to reduce its dependence on Moscow. Yet the project concerns a specific vulnerability: the supply of fuel for Europe’s remaining Soviet-designed reactors. It illustrates an uncomfortable feature of strategic autonomy. Breaking a long-established monopoly may temporarily require access to the licences, expertise and industrial knowledge held by the monopolist itself.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe has pursued one strategic objective with growing determination: reducing its dependence on Russia in critical sectors. Russian fossil-fuel imports have fallen, alternative suppliers have been developed and sanctions have expanded across finance, technology and industry. Against this backdrop, the recent decision by German authorities to permit a French nuclear company to manufacture Russian-designed fuel assemblies in Germany using Russian licences and technical know-how appears almost paradoxical. Rather than exposing a failure of European sanctions, however, the decision raises a more fundamental question: how does a continent reduce dependence on a strategic monopoly when that monopoly still controls key elements of the technology, licensing and expertise needed to replace it? [1, 2]

At the centre of the debate is Advanced Nuclear Fuels, or ANF, the German fuel-manufacturing subsidiary of the French nuclear group Framatome, which operates a fabrication facility in Lingen, Lower Saxony. German regulators have authorised the company to manufacture hexagonal fuel assemblies for VVER reactors. The abbreviation derives from the Russian term for a water-water energetic reactor and describes a family of Soviet-designed pressurised-water reactors still operating in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary and Slovakia. The Lingen project initially relies on Russian licences, industrial know-how and intellectual property supplied by TVEL, Rosatom’s nuclear-fuel subsidiary. [2, 3, 4]

The approval immediately sparked political controversy in Germany. Lower Saxony’s Environment Minister Christian Meyer described business with the Russian nuclear corporation as politically wrong in light of the war against Ukraine. Nevertheless, the authorities concluded that the application could not legally be rejected on political grounds alone. German nuclear law required them to assess safety, security and regulatory compliance. Broader restrictions on cooperation with Russia’s nuclear sector would have required sanctions at European level, for which there has so far been insufficient agreement among EU member states. [2, 3]

The permit was therefore granted with extensive security conditions. Employees of TVEL and Rosatom are prohibited from entering the production facility. Russian machinery, software and imported components must undergo external inspection, while relevant systems are to remain separated from the rest of the plant’s information technology. Fuel rods delivered from Russia must also be checked for possible manipulation. [2, 3]

The sensitivity of the project extends beyond the fuel market itself. Rosatom is not merely Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation but an important instrument of state policy. Its international offer combines reactor construction with financing, fuel, maintenance, training and regulatory support. These relationships can bind customers to Russian technology and services for decades, turning commercial contracts into durable political and technological dependencies. [5]

Rosatom’s role in the war against Ukraine reinforces those concerns. Russian forces seized the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in March 2022, and the facility has since remained under Russian military and administrative control. Rosatom personnel and senior officials have been involved in its management, placing the corporation at the centre of one of the most politically and technically sensitive aspects of the occupation. [3, 6]

Much of the public reporting has focused on the apparent contradiction of a country that has abandoned nuclear power allowing Russian-licensed nuclear fuel to be manufactured on German soil. Yet the more important question is why Framatome is pursuing such a politically sensitive project at all. The answer lies in the legacy of Europe’s Cold War reactor fleet.

Numerous VVER reactors remain central to electricity production in Central and Eastern Europe. For decades, their operators procured fuel almost exclusively from TVEL, leaving an important part of European energy infrastructure exposed to a single Russian supplier. After the invasion of Ukraine, this dependence became increasingly difficult to reconcile with European energy security. Operators therefore began searching for alternative fuel designs and suppliers capable of serving reactors originally built around Soviet technology. [4]

The Lingen project is far from the first Western effort to challenge Rosatom’s near-monopoly in this market. Westinghouse has already developed independent fuel for VVER reactors and now holds supply contracts with operators across Europe. Its fuel has been introduced in Ukraine, Finland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, while further deliveries and licensing processes are under way elsewhere, including Hungary. [7, 8]

Lingen therefore represents a second pathway towards the same strategic objective. Westinghouse has invested in fuel designs developed independently of Rosatom. Framatome has chosen a different route, using Russian licences and expertise to establish additional manufacturing capacity inside Europe while separately developing a fully European fuel product. Relocating production, however, is not the same as transferring control over the underlying technology. [2, 7, 9]

That distinction lies at the heart of the debate. Manufacturing fuel in Germany reduces the immediate logistical dependence on direct deliveries from Russia and creates an additional European production site. Yet as long as the product depends on Russian licences, designs or specialised knowledge, part of the original technological dependency remains intact. The project can therefore be understood either as a bridge towards independence or as a new European layer built around continuing Russian intellectual property.

The logic extends beyond the nuclear sector. Europe’s replacement of Russian gas initially relied on existing global infrastructure and alternative foreign suppliers rather than immediate self-sufficiency. Its critical-raw-materials strategy seeks diversification while many processing chains remain geographically concentrated. Semiconductor policy likewise aims to build European capacity inside an industrial ecosystem whose most advanced components and production stages are distributed across several continents. [1, 10, 11]

Strategic autonomy is therefore rarely created by a single political decision. It is usually the result of a managed transition in which old dependencies are gradually narrowed, alternative suppliers are qualified and domestic knowledge is rebuilt. Such transitions can require continued interaction with the very supply chains they are intended to replace. Their success depends not on avoiding every temporary contradiction, but on ensuring that each step reduces rather than preserves the underlying dependency.

Whether the transition in Lingen succeeds will therefore depend on one decisive condition: Russian involvement must steadily diminish rather than become institutionalised inside a European production chain. Westinghouse has already demonstrated that independently developed alternatives are possible. Framatome’s approach may expand production capacity more rapidly, but ultimately the project in Lingen will not be judged by the location of its production line, but by whether it marks the beginning of the end of Rosatom’s leverage over the fuel supply chain for Europe’s Soviet-designed reactors.

Sources

[1] European Commission. “REPowerEU.” Updated May 31, 2026.
https://commission.europa.eu/topics/energy/repowereu_en

[2] Reuters. “German Nuclear Fuel Plant Cleared to Work with Russia’s Rosatom.” July 22, 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/german-nuclear-fuel-plant-cleared-work-with-russias-rosatom-2026-07-22/

[3] Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Umwelt, Energie und Klimaschutz. “Änderungsgenehmigung für die Brennelementfertigungsanlage Lingen.” July 2026.
https://www.umwelt.niedersachsen.de/download/230500

[4] World Nuclear Association. “Nuclear Power in the European Union.” Accessed July 27, 2026.
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union

[5] World Nuclear Association. “Nuclear Power in Russia.” Accessed July 27, 2026.
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-power

[6] International Atomic Energy Agency. “Timeline of the IAEA’s Response Activities to the Situation in Ukraine.” Accessed July 27, 2026.
https://www.iaea.org/interactive/timeline/169792

[7] Westinghouse Electric Company. “Westinghouse Hosts Annual VVER Fuel Forum with Customers.” April 8, 2026.
https://info.westinghousenuclear.com/news/westinghouse-hosts-annual-vver-fuel-forum-with-customers

[8] Westinghouse Electric Company. “Westinghouse Completes First VVER Fuel Deliveries to Temelín and Dukovany Nuclear Power Plants.” June 16, 2025.
https://info.westinghousenuclear.com/news/westinghouse-completes-first-vver-fuel-deliveries-to-temel%C3%ADn-and-dukovany-nuclear-power-plants

[9] Framatome. “Framatome Receives European Funding for the Development of a 100% Sovereign European Fuel for VVER Reactors.” June 20, 2024.
https://www.framatome.com/medias/framatome-receives-european-funding-for-the-development-of-a-100-sovereign-european-fuel-for-vver-reactors/

[10] European Commission. “European Critical Raw Materials Act.” Accessed July 27, 2026.
https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en

[11] European Commission. “The EU Budget Bolsters Europe’s Technological Leadership through the European Chips Act.” Accessed July 27, 2026.
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/motion/focus/eu-budget-bolsters-europes-technological-leadership-european-chips-act_en